The Cap Trap

Why convertible notes exist

Convertible notes beat equity as the financing of choice for early stage startups largely because they were faster. While later stage companies can afford the time necessary to negotiate long sets of terms, early stage companies don't have that luxury. Not only are prices for such early stage entities nearly impossible (and therefore time consuming) to determine, time is itself the most limited resource a startup has - it's critical to raise quickly and get back to work. Though equity financings can be standardized up to a point, there's always a huge sticking point for negotiations: price. Rather than try standardizing, convertibles notes simply got rid of price as a term.

While the notes eliminated price, they needed structures to govern what the investment would be worth when a price finally did come into play. Price was replaced with two other mechanisms - a discount rate and a cap.[1] While each of these was a negotiable point, they were each and cumulatively less meaningful than price, because they deferred the core pricing question to the next round of financing. Ideally, that meant shorter negotiations on less significant terms. With a priced financing meant to take place within the year (based on the note's maturity), investors were willing to punt on pricing while founders were willing to roll their risk a bit further down the road and get back to work.

The cap trap

But a funny thing happened on the way to this ideal state - caps became implied prices. It isn't all that surprising that this happened. The best founders know that setting goals based on real numbers is critical to sustained growth. They're also incredibly competitive. By removing real prices from fundraising, the convertible note nullified a part of the fundraising game that was important to the egos of founders (and investors). Without a number on which to hang their success, startups lost a public way to "prove" how good they were. At that point, the cap became an obvious choice for an approximation of price: It was a hard number, it could/should reflect something about the note holder's expectations of the price at which the company would next raise money, and it is typically not that well understood.[2]

This introduced several unintended problems. The most extreme of these issues was the advent of the "uncapped" note. To some founders, this was the holy grail. In a very naive sense, this implied an infinite valuation - companies were so hot that investors were saying they'd accept any price at some point in the future just to get in. Practically speaking, this scenario - paired with not having a discount - creates a misalignment of incentives between the investor and the startup. Rather than trying to help the startup move as fast and far as possible prior to the next round of financing, investors are actually incentivized to get as low a price on the first equity as possible so that they are able to convert in at a reasonable price. Conversely, the startup wants to move as fast as possible - as all startups should - and give up as little as the company as possible. While that tension always exists on some level, the dynamic is particularly extreme in these cases.

The second problem came from startups who raised too little money with too high a cap. Convertible notes are debt. They accrue interest and have maturity dates. As a result, it tends to be a bad idea to raise too much money through them. While investors rarely call the notes, the accrued interest can become a significant dilutive factor. But, since founders decided that high caps = good caps, startups would do crazy things like raise $1mm on a $20mm cap with one year maturity.[3] The hurdles set for a company in that scenario were almost unimaginable - and contradictory! Inside of a year, that company would have to grow to a point where raising money at above a $20mm valuation was not just possible, but likely. Otherwise, again because of the common misperception that cap = price, they'd have to raise a "down round". However, if by some miracle they raised above the cap, the investors would get the same % they initially agreed to, but would also get higher liquidation preference.[4]

Ironically, while convertible notes were initially designed to allow good companies to raise money quickly and get back to work, the best companies are precisely the ones that most frequently fell into these cap traps.

Being smarter when raising money

Recently, Y Combinator released a new financing instrument, called the safe, designed to eliminate parts of these problems. By removing interest and maturity dates, the safe makes it easier for companies to raise larger amounts than on notes while avoiding putting themselves in impossible situations. However, the ultimate responsibility for restraining the temptation to raise at ever higher caps rests with founders. Understanding how and why convertible notes and safe exist is the first step. That's easy, it's just reading. The second step is much harder, but equally worth it - founders need to overcome their egos. That might be impossible, but it's well worth the effort.

__

[1] Notes also have elements of debt: interest rates and maturity.

[2] I've had conversations with both founders and investors in which it has been apparent that this is one of several terms that are commonly misconstrued. Those misunderstandings lead to different actors using caps as placeholders for different things, which complicates the picture.

[3] I'm being extreme, but have heard of crazier.

[4] David Hornik explores this more in his post Just Say No To Capped Notes. He rightly points out that the capped note is an at times awkward compromise, but I disagree that the resolution should be all uncapped notes or all equity financings. 

Poker and Roulette

A friend of mine was a professional poker player for years. One of the more interesting things he taught me was that he could predict his earnings when playing online poker. I had assumed, based on my own inexpert poker playing, that, while there were knowable odds that would improve your chances of winning, you always had to deal with other people as an unpredictable variable. That's why you ended up with big pots that could break players - they judged the odds wrong and lost.

As I thought about it, I realized that those scenarios were not mutually exclusive. You could play thousands of games for small stakes and edge up by predictable, if limited, amounts. Part of the positive expected return came from the basic odds of poker, and some came from playing against people who simply didn't understand the odds as well. At the other extreme, you could play single huge games where the variance of outcomes could empty your bank account or massively increase it on a single hand.

The parallel to startups wasn't immediately obvious to me. Risk based scenarios can all be modeled given certain assumptions. If an investor could model those variables accurately, they would know exactly how much return they would expect out of investing x dollars over y companies. If they had enough of the right variables predicted, they could just bet the winners - imagine an investor so good they could divine the information needed to only invest in Google, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn. Given how valuable solving that risk equation is, investors are obviously going to do everything they can to solve for those variables.

The dynamic that starts playing out, then, is that you have different investors playing different games, even though they think they're playing the same one. If you start with the assumption that startups are extremely likely to fail [1], then investing with no further information is a bit like roulette. Place your bet, and maybe you get massively lucky - but that's all it is. So the investors seek information to change the game into something closer to poker, where their odds rise dramatically and quantifiably. Meeting the founders, validating the market, testing the product, seeing traction - each of these edge the game closer to one with a positive expected outcome. The best investors find ways to change the game before anyone else does, reaching decisions faster and more accurately (professional players among amateurs). The worst investors don't even realize what's wrong with playing roulette.[2]

Founders looking to raise money can use this dynamic to their advantage. The simplest read on that advantage is that founders should do that by being tricky with the information they release and to whom they release it. By doing that, you could keep all the investors off balance and hyper competitive with one another. That should theoretically drive your value up. This seems clever, and clever seems good. But that's actually a bad idea for a few reasons. The first is that investors talk to one another and so your information will get around anyway, but it will happen out of your control and will probably reflect badly on you.[3] The second, and more important one, is that if you are tricky with releasing information, the best investors, the poker players, won't feel comfortable with you. You'll restrict your potential pool of investors to the roulette players, which tend to be the least good investors.

It's probably better to treat your interested investors fairly similarly in terms of what you tell them. The goal is to build a company so good that the information you release forces investors to rush to a decision they feel good about before anyone else does. You want to help the good investors get past the roulette stage so that they'll make an offer they believe will help you make them a lot of money.

If you do that right, you'll have good, smart, investors who are aligned with you and your interests. If you only have the roulette players, you probably did it wrong.

___

[1] I've seen this number pegged as high as 99%, but who trusts statistics?

[2] Of course, since they're playing a game of chance, they might actually get lucky and win big. Some will admit they got lucky, most will call it skill and inspire other similarly foolish people to do the same.

[3] It also starts to get very difficult to keep straight what information you gave to who, and your energy should be spent on building a company, not managing a web of information dispersal.